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“To endeavor to shape people and populations to conform to an 
‘imagined future’ in which the present ascendant values, 
understandings, and intentions are manifest…is not only eugenic 
but also an untenable enterprise.” 
—Rosemarie Garland-Thomson1 
“It would be naïve to seek solidity in a heaven of ideas or in a 
ground (fond) of meaning— […] the very idea of objective 
knowledge and…the idea of an object that informs itself and 
knows itself are, as much as any other ideas, and more than any 
other, supported by our reveries.”  
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty2 
Introduction 
Modern scientific methods have allowed humans to significantly extend 
their average lifespan, create life under circumstances previously thought 
impossible, and maintain life after both environmental and genetic events that in 
centuries past would have meant immediate or inevitable death.3 Whether one 
looks to the policies of the NIH, UN, or Gates Foundation, this wealth of 
scientific knowledge about the human body has transformed how we think about 
individual humans as well as the fundamental framework and goals of their socio-
political existence. Governments govern, communities coalesce, and individuals 
choose by and in parameters set by the value of health and the many private and 
public entities that produce its power, knowledge, and guidance. Yet, modern 
scientific methods and their manifold effects have also put within reach the total 
annihilation of our species and set into motion global processes that will 
powerfully curtail, if not hasten the end of, human life on Earth. Initially, this 
potential extinction will likely come through the widescale death and suffering of 
historically marginalized groups and the economically disadvantaged.4 Both at the 
level of knowing and of praxis, the methods and modes that underwrite the rise of 
the biopolitical—and, increasingly, the infopolitical—are the very methods and 
modes that have underwritten processes of global injustice the scale of which are 
unparalleled across recorded history.5 Where, precisely, does health fit in this 
history? 
 Socially and politically, modern conceptions of health function as a 
stratagem or gambit. They assume a certain naiveté regarding the mortal necessity 
and curious transitions of aging, the social construction of normality, and the 
biological ambiguity of typicality—of the typos, the kind. This naiveté is 
profoundly productive. The fear of death and the changes it occasions are best 
tamed by never rising to the level of a fear: I’m not afraid of dying; I just want to 
live life to the fullest. The desire to be normal, to not be a misfit, is best tamed by 
being framed as a desire for flourishing: I’m not against being different; I just 
want things to go more easily as I pursue my goals.6 The instinct to categorize 
things absolutely is best tamed by an impassioned fidelity to scientific method, 
the density of fact, and the gravity of the mean: I’m not saying there aren’t 
variations; I just want you to know how evolution has structured things. Each of 
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these strategies contribute in fundamental ways to the positive production of 
health, a production which garners and leverages untold amounts of capital and, 
far too often, functions to cover over a litany of historic and contemporary 
injustices baked into the fabric of each society it touches. The truism that 
‘everyone wants to be healthy’ is superseded in rank only by the assumption that 
there is such a thing as health—that health is an objective fact of the world by 
which we can produce objective knowledge about morbidity and mortality, 
functioning and flourishing, and forms of life. Is health, then, a reverie?  
 In the epigraph above from The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
claims that “the very idea of objective knowledge [is] supported by our reveries.”7 
My aim in this paper is to interrogate this claim with respect to the phenomenon 
of health. In section one and as a case study for the analysis to follow, I look at a 
contemporary, highly specific site of health screening: return of results of 
incidental variants or variants of unknown significance with respect to the use of 
genetic and genomic screening technologies (GSTs) in newborn and pediatric 
contexts. These screenings, undergirded by decades of basic, applied, and 
transitional work in genomic medical sciences as a whole, produce situations 
wherein parents might face knowing, or face potentially knowing, the health fate 
of their own children—a fate that could include early and inevitable death. 
Drawing on a range of Merleau-Ponty’s texts, but with a special focus on his 
course notes for his Collège de France lectures on the concept of nature, I show 
how this scene of care reveals a tension between the macro and the micro, 
between medical research and practice as a science of the general and the 
patient’s interest in medical care as an art of treating an individual. 
 In section two, I further develop this concern by arguing that genomic 
medical sciences reveal an even more fundamental tension between two distinct 
ways of conceiving of the human: homo faber, the human understood as 
controller of fate through the creation and use of tools, vs. what I term homo 
curare, the human understood as conspiring with fate through the guidance and 
practice of care. Each of these conceptions lead to distinct interpretations of the 
proper role and balance between the macro and the micro. I argue that by looking 
to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh it becomes clear that homo faber and 
homo curare are but two modalities of the relationship between fleshly beings like 
us and the concept of health. 
 In the final section, I examine the aforementioned arguments in the 
context of larger issues of social justice. With respect to the studies that I examine 
and given the demographics of those with access to technologies like GSTs, I 
suggest that under the aegis of homo faber, health as a reverie upholds white, 
cishet, able-bodied, settler colonialist, upper middle-class privilege. This, then, is 
an idea of health functioning not as a harmless reverie, but a dangerous reverie 
particularly apt to contribute to and maintain injustice in both theory and practice. 
It is only by better balancing homo faber and homo curare, the human as maker 
and the human as carer, that the idea of health will transform from a dangerous 
reverie into a more just reality. 
 An initial caveat is in order concerning how this piece fits in relation to the 
large body of scholarship on Merleau-Ponty. Research engaging central figures in 
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Continental/European philosophy typically takes two forms today. There is figure 
scholarship, which works out philosophical problems directly through or within 
the oeuvre of the thinker or thinkers in question. There is also problem-based 
scholarship, which uses the insights of a thinker or thinkers to address and gain 
understanding concerning a problem. This paper is an instance of the latter. Both 
approaches strike me as valuable, for different though at times overlapping 
purposes. Still, it is worth noting that a problem-based use of continental figures 
is arguably more common in the social sciences than it is in the humanities (just 
consider the wide range and use of figures like Michel Foucault, one of the more 
cited figures in the twentieth century as a whole). One reason for this is that the 
social sciences are, at least typically, oriented towards building knowledge about 
various sorts of social phenomena as opposed to learning more about a particular 
thinker. I adopt a problem-first method here because while working upon ethical, 
legal, and social issues related to genomics, I found myself turning again and 
again to Merleau-Ponty for insights and answers to the debates at play—whether 
with respect to return of results of secondary findings or the psychosocial impact 
of genomic knowledge upon people more generally. In short, it was by turning to 
Merleau-Ponty for answers to concrete problems that this project came to fruition, 
and this paper engages Merleau-Ponty in that admittedly applied spirit. 
Would You Like to Know When Your Child Will Die? 
 
Your young child is exhibiting unusual physiological or behavioral 
symptoms. You have anguished over their meaning, maybe for 
months or even years—anguished over what may or may not be 
the case. At the suggestion of your medical provider, you agree to 
whole genome sequencing. You do so because you think it is the 
best way, and perhaps also the last way, to figure out what is going 
on in order for you to know how to care for your child. Not 
another’s child or children in general, but your child. Genomic 
information will help one do this. 
 
This assumption concerning the helpfulness of genomic information in this 
vignette in fact runs counter in important respects to the methodological milieu of 
modern medical science as well as modern medical care. The ultimate focus of the 
primary institutions of medicine turns not on the person as unique microcosm—
one laden with a singular history, personal, biological, genomic, and the like, and 
with unique cares, traumas, fears, desires, and plans—but on the person as 
macrocosm, as an particular instance of homo sapiens or of some specific 
population of homo sapiens.8 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, “for what 
the doctor appears to consider is not even health, but human health, and 
presumably the health of this human being even more, since he treats one 
particular patient at a time.”9 In this terse formulation, Aristotle lays out the 
complex relationship between the practice of individualized care, of singular, 
micro-level treatment, and the reflective, knowledge-building processes 
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concerning human health, of general, macro-level considerations. Although there 
is a singular patient before a clinician, the knowledge brought to bear on that 
patient is knowledge ultimately developed in and derived from the vast body of 
modern scientific knowledge about humans and about patients—knowledge that 
has grown exponentially in recent decades. Yet, as Aristotle contends, the end of 
medical care is nevertheless supposed to be the care of the specific patient a 
clinician is treating. As calls for the import of narrative medicine as well as 
values-based practice makes clear, focus on the patient as an individual is not 
today the norm.10 At the heart of modern medicine, at least, lies a tension between 
the micro and the macro. 
 Merleau-Ponty, in the context of a larger critique of a statistical approach 
to evolution, puts a finer point on the issue, writing “in all the sciences, there is a 
distinction of the micro and the macro, beyond the principle of causality…the 
schema are everywhere the same, absorbing the ‘historical given.’ The 
macroscopic facts of evolution do not bring out more of this analysis than does 
the aerial photo of the electronic microscope.”11 A few lines later, he argues, 
“geneticists study evolution from the point of view of Homo faber.”12 Within 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, genetics (and what would later be called genomics) is a 
macro-level study of the structures of natural development carried out under the 
auspices of being able to change human fates; genomics plays out on one side of 
the medical tension Aristotle describes.  
 Laying the groundwork for later historians and critics of genetic and 
genomic sciences like Lily E. Kay, Troy Duster, Nathaniel Comfort, and Colin 
Koopman, Merleau-Ponty understands contemporary genomics as an instance of 
third-person, modern scientific knowledge to be predicated upon the assumption 
that the human can, through what is ultimately macroscopic knowledge about the 
human organism, build tools to control its own fate even at the level of the 
microscopic. Genomics, on this view, is a project of and for homo faber: the 
human understood as master of its own fate. This places the question at hand in 
sharper terms: will genomic health information, operating fundamentally as it 
does at a macro level, help you know how to care for your child?  
 To answer that question, consider the following example. Since 2010, the 
American College of Medical Genetics has supported chromosomal microarray as 
a first-tier test for individuals with several types of suspected genetic diseases.13 
These screenings can determine whether or not someone has a copy-number-
variant (CNV), and here is the sort of information a parent, presented with the 
option or suggestion to agree to such a test for their child, might encounter: 
 
CNVs are a type of structural variant involving alterations in the 
number of copies of  specific regions of DNA, which can either 
be deleted or duplicated. These chromosomal deletions and 
duplications involve fairly large stretches of DNA (that is, 
thousands of  nucleotides [>1 kb], which may span many different 
genes) but can range considerably in  size as well as prevalence. As 
is the case for other types of genetic mutations, some CNVs are 
inherited whereas others spontaneously arise de novo…There are 
Health and Other Reveries 
Reynolds   5
several well- characterized rare developmental phenotypes 
caused by CNVs of known pathogenicity, such as 
Velocardiofacial, Prader-Willi, and Smith-Magenis syndromes. 
Although the role of most CNVs is far less clear, there is now 
growing evidence that the genetic architecture of more common 
psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions includes different 
types of both common and rare genetic variation. An increased 
burden of rare  CNVs has been observed and replicated in several 
conditions. These include autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and intellectual 
disability (ID), as well as schizophrenia. CNVs also contribute to 
risk of  idiopathic epilepsy.14 
 
Werner‐Lin et al. detail the case of a mother who underwent chromosomal 
microarray screening. Her baby tested positive for a copy-number-variant with a 
highly variable phenotype. The mother reports that her provider reactions ran the 
gamut from: 
“Doom and gloom” to “(t)his baby’s perfectly fine, why are they 
putting you through this?” As her daughter reached 6 months, she 
said: “I’m constantly questioning ‘is this because of her disorder?’ 
For example, she’s a really bad sleeper so for the longest time I 
thought ‘wow, is this her deletion or is it just that she’s five months 
old and she sucks at sleeping like most babies?’”15  
Another parent said, 
Once or twice it’s crept into my head where I’ve been like ‘what if 
this microarray result…like there’s something wrong with her and 
we don’t know and one day she just has SIDS [sudden infant death 
syndrome] and stops breathing. She’s got such a strangely mellow 
temperament, so I think, ‘is there something wrong with her that 
she’s just so lovely’—which makes no sense.16 
Geneticists study evolution from the point of view of homo faber, yet parents, 
these studies suggest, seek out and interpret genomic information from the point 
of view of homo curare. I coin this term to refer to the human understood from the 
point of view of a being oriented and defined by care, i.e., a being instituted and 
constituted through relations of concern.17 These parents are not interpreting 
genetic information qua homo faber, but qua homo curare. That is to say, these 
parents report micro-level concerns—specifically ones concerning the possibility 
of their child becoming “abnormal.”18 They struggle to reconcile macro, genomic 
information understood from the view of homo faber with its micro, lived 
meaning understood from the view of homo curare.  
 By characterizing the issues and scenes at hand in this way, I do not 
merely aim to invoke the architectonic role of care (Sorge) in Heidegger’s Being 
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and Time. As important as that analysis is, it offers little understanding of the role 
of embodiment for the institution, determination, and provision of care. Instead, I 
primarily aim to highlight the way that our reasons, actions, judgments, 
perceptions, and cognitions are all shaped by Einfühlung, which is to say, shaped 
by a fleshly body that feels above and beyond any of those ‘feelings’ that rise to 
the level of consciousness and thereby earn the name. “Before trying,” Merleau-
Ponty writes, “we notice that the body as corporal schema, the esthesiological 
body, the flesh (le corps, comme schéma corporel, le corps esthésiologique, la 
chair) have already given us the Einfühlung of the body with perceived being 
(l'être perçu) and with other bodies. That is, the body as the power (pouvoir) of 
Einfühlung [typically translated as ‘empathy’] is already desire, libido, projection-
introjection, identification.”19 The body, for Merleau-Ponty, is always already a 
scene of em-pathy understood in this expansive sense, a scene of what I 
understand in terms of and as defined by care. And the meaningfulness of bodily 
actions and bodily styles—from being a “really bad sleeper” as the first parent 
worries to having a “strangely mellow temperament” as the second parent 
worries—are interpreted in the light of enfleshed Einfühlung. In these cases that 
translates to a desire for normality, the fear of “becoming disabled,” and the 
preemptive identification of their “true” child— the child they were supposed to 
have and/or the child who was supposed to develop, as “normal” and “healthy.”  
 To appreciate this point, a more careful discussion of the meaning of the 
flesh (la chair) is in order. For Merleau-Ponty, the flesh names that texture at 
which the body and world touch; the origin point of all horizons in which things 
become possible phenomena of concern. He writes, “This magical relation, this 
pact between them [things] and me…this fold, this central cavity of the visible 
which is my vision, these two mirror arrangements of the seeing and the visible, 
the touching and the touched, form a close-bound system that I count on…the 
flesh (of the world or my own) is not contingency, chaos, but a texture that returns 
to itself and conforms to itself.”20 To understand the flesh as a texture indicates 
that it neither exists in pure space (the geometer’s formulae cannot, e.g., render 
the “red shaggy carpet”), nor in pure time (there is no quantifiable time in which 
the run of one’s hand over the carpet “grasps” its shagginess, specific texture, or 
its redness). The flesh, in short, is that medium through which things become 
meaningful.21 The flesh, one could say, is a turgid or tumescent concept, which is 
to say, part of what the concept picks out is precisely a conceptual excess beyond 
the binary couplings so easily birthed and latched onto by beings like us. The 
“really bad sleeper” and the “strangely mellow temperament” are not the results, 
potential or actual, of genomic differences. They are moments of apprehension of 
our fleshly being in the unending project to understand its meaningfulness. 
 Understood as flesh, the body is the ground of the possibilities of the 
human as homo curare, and it is so through a complex interaction of the body as 
the power (pouvoir) of Einfühlung, as a texture already shot through with specific 
desires, libidos, projection-introjections, and identifications. To be a fleshly being, 
then, just is to be a being defined by care. As I explain in more detail below, both 
homo curare and also homo faber are modalities of beings of flesh; each are 
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responses to and ways in which such a form of existence is taken up as a project. 
 
Homo Curare, Homo Faber, and Flesh 
 
You agree to whole genome sequencing, just as those parents did. 
You do so because you think it is the best way, and perhaps also 
the last way, to figure out what is going on in order for you to 
know how to care for your child. However, during the appointment 
to receive the results of this test, you are told the sequencing 
revealed a piece of information about your child’s future that has 
nothing to do with either your present concerns or that of your 
doctors. Hence the name incidental or secondary variants. Among 
other things, these findings could suggest that your child will 
succumb to Huntington’s disease, a fatal genetic disorder that 
causes the progressive breakdown of nerve cells in the brain. 
“Symptoms usually appear between the ages of 30 to 50 and 
worsen over a 10- to 25-year period. Ultimately, someone with 
Huntington’s succumbs to pneumonia, heart failure, or other 
complications” due to the progression of the disease.22 It is 
possible, however, that the variants portend a condition far less 
severe, or maybe they end up meaning nothing at all.  
 
But your medical provider can’t explain any details until you first 
agree to hear the information. And even if the variant does suggest 
something as momentous as Huntington’s, the data could be wrong 
or ambiguous. Because, it always bears repeating, these tests do 
not tell you what will happen. They do not and cannot predict the 
future with absolute certainty. Your genome does not, all on its 
own, fully decide your future. One’s environment affects which 
genes are expressed over time, and also how they are expressed. 
Even in the case of monogenic diseases—diseases originating from 
a mutation in a single gene present on one or both chromosomes—
the story and timeline of their phenotypic expression is 
complicated and diverse.  
 
Even if genes did have this magical power, these tests can provide 
false positives. They are, of course, limited both to the current state 
of medical knowledge about genomics and also to the information 
sequencing and analysis on the computer science side, which is to 
say, all the many technological devices and programming 
algorithms that allow the sequencing and analysis of genomes on 
the way to their diagnostic-prognostic interpretation in the first 
place.  
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To address this situation, let us return to the tension discussed above between the 
micro and the macro. Merleau-Ponty continues, “there is a complementarity that 
forbids the simultaneous fixing on the micro and the macro.”23 The term 
“complementarity” is here deployed in the sense used by physicists to describe 
how “the capacity of the wave and particle theories of light” are complementary 
insofar as they together “explain all phenomena of a certain type, although each 
separately accounts for only some of the phenomena.”24 Complementarity, in this 
sense, does not suggest that one of two (or more) ways of understanding, 
perceiving, judging, or conceiving of a phenomenon is necessarily better or more 
accurate than another; it is only to say that (a) those ways are distinct in 
determinate respects, (b) it is only through bringing both explanatory modes 
together that one will end up with a more holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon in question, and (c) one cannot hold both ways together at the same 
time. Indeed, how would one bring together the explanatory modes at the macro-
level of genomics with the micro-level of a singular life? How would one bring 
together information, knowledge, and understanding fashioned in the light of 
homo faber with that of homo curare? 
 The role of the flesh—and, thereby, the distinct modalities of homo curare 
and homo faber—is difficult to see on the dominant macro-level understanding of 
the meaning of genomics. David Morris, working to correct the dominant 
interpretation, writes:  
[Genomic] information has standing as such only by virtue of 
ongoing and historical material and energetic dynamic flows that 
are part and parcel of what it takes to inherit genetic material and 
grow a body. These flows move through the medium of growing 
bodies in environments. We think the genetic information is there, 
right in and reducible to genetic material. But what we are really 
seeing when we (rightly) grasp genetic material as having an 
informative role is an effect of ongoing biochemical histories and 
dynamics washing through a body growing in this-here place.25  
Although Morris does not use the language of the flesh at this point in his 
argument, I understand “a body growing in this-here place” as a gloss on that 
concept. A properly “enfleshed” understanding of genomics sees the way in 
which it neither presents us with definitive control over populations or 
individuals, nor does it tell us how to care. It is, instead, but one slice of ongoing 
and historical material and energetic dynamic flows; one slice of the organism as 
what Merleau-Ponty calls an “envelopment-phenomenon”:  
  
[The] organism is not only its local-instantaneous reality, neither 
for a proximal thinking, nor moreover another reality. It is the 
macroscopic ‘envelopment-phenomenon’ [phénomène-enveloppe] 
that we do not engender from elements, that invests the local-
instantaneity, that is not to be sought behind, but rather between 
the elements…instead of a science of the world by relations 
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contemplated from the outside (relations of space, for example), 
the body is the measurement of the world [le corps est le mesurant 
du monde].26  
To say that the body—again, understood here as flesh—is the measurement of the 
world is to say that the meaningfulness of the world emerges against the horizon 
of our cares and our control. The tension of the micro and the macro is that span 
in which we measure our cares. The tension at play in the scenes of care analyzed 
above for parents seeking out genomic information is a tension between such 
measurement understood as a tool for control and such measurement understood 
as a tool for care. Our imbrication with the world, our fleshly being-in-the-world, 
is the stuff out of which and by which measurements like these can be taken. 
 Recall the central question at stake in GSTs: what does it mean, today, to 
care for one’s child—and not just their present, but as modern biomedical 
technologies increasingly promise, their future? More specifically, what does the 
twentieth-century project of genetics all the way from Watson and Crick’s 
discovery of the double-helix to the contemporary promises of the Human 
Genome Project indicate about the evolution of the flesh? About the human as a 
being shot-through not merely with senses trained by the social and scientific, not 
merely causes and determinates, but also cares— the weight of an ever unique 
texture that both conditions us and opens us up to what makes our condition our 
own? What does this evolution portend for the epistemic space and intentional 
reach of our care for others, especially, in this case, intimate others? Concerning 
such questions, homo faber, just as homo curare, is condemned to uncertainty. 
Heeding Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the flesh, the difference between homo faber 
and homo curare is, then, not one of kind, but degree. Cares borne in the body qua 
flesh already span the hermeneutic distance between homo faber and homo 
curare, for it is as flesh that the micro and the macro come together at the level of 
lived experience.27 
 At this point, the following claim can be offered: the meaning-making 
relationship between homo faber and homo curare is one of modes of fleshly care. 
The human as creator of a world and of its fashioning is one modality of the 
human who explicitly measures the world in terms of its cares; cares that are 
always indexed to its institution and constitution as a fleshly, embodied being. 
Cares envelop all phenomena within one’s world—i.e., within the totality of 
meaningful relations of one’s experience—and the meaningfulness of caring as 
well as any of our particular cares emerges out of the envelopment-phenomenon 
that is the flesh in its irreducible relationship with its environment. It is in this 
sense that care operates at the interstices of inside/outside, first- and third-person, 
micro and macro views. Care is determinate for meaning, for sens, by 
fundamentally mediating the phenomenality of phenomena.  
Existential Homeostasis and Existential Support 
While I have explained the relationship between homo faber and homo 
curare in some depth, I have not yet addressed the problem of how we care or 
how we conceive of care. It is through this question that the differences between 
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homo faber and homo curare appear starkest. For homo faber, what is ultimately 
at stake in scenes of genetic and genomic sequencing technologies is care 
conducted as control over fate; a control fashioned through the creation and use 
of tools. For homo curare, what is ultimately at stake in scenes of genetic and 
genomic sequencing technologies is care conducted as provisioning of support; a 
control fashioned through working with others and community, while acting upon 
the social conditions that make caring possible in the first place.  
 For homo faber, care conducted as control over fate aims at existential 
homeostasis: the experience of feeling that the meaning of one’s life will stay the 
same. Existential homeostasis is underwritten by a desire for normality; it is an 
experience of the continuity or trapping of ability relations and the linking of that 
experience with the meaning and maintenance of health.28 If that account is right, 
then health as a reverie of homo faber is a project to extend the trap of fluctuation 
that constitutes the organism to the experiential field of that organism. Health 
becomes a forgetting of both fluctuation and the traps that hold it. That is to say, 
there is a way in which the desire to establish normality—in this sense of the 
trapping of what is taken to be “one’s own” abilities as the only way to establish 
health—is an act taken in defiance of both the life course and bodily difference. 
As long as human cares are shaped by a demand for health as longevity and health 
as normality, a fundamentally ableist demand, that vision of health will orient the 
measurement of the world. It will become a phenomenon through which the world 
is enveloped and, thus, against which it is measured. In this light and based upon 
the qualitative sociological work analyzed above that one can see why scenes of 
care driven primarily by homo faber are destructive, for this way of being-
towards-health seeks not to create the conditions of support for the health of all, 
but instead to conduct control over the fate of solely one’s own, in this case, one’s 
own child. 
 For homo curare, care conducted as provisioning of support aims not 
merely for existential support, but social support: the provisioning of assistance 
for the care of those around one. Insofar as the orbit of concern of homo curare 
extends beyond oneself and one’s kin, social support is a project of justice. Scenes 
of care like those involving GSTs are not simply about the meaning of one’s 
child’s life, but about the world in which one and one’s child lives. Homo curare 
is actively attuned to the ways in which one is always already in relation with 
others and with their wellbeing. The demand for health as individual longevity 
and health as normality, paradigmatic of homo faber, transforms into a demand 
for health for all of us for homo curare. 
 Consider another study of parental responses to receiving information 
from GSTs concerning their children. J. A. Anderson et al. write that  
[O]f 83 invited, 23 parents from 18 families participated [in the 
study]. These parents supported WGS [a form of GSTs] as a 
diagnostic test, perceiving clear intrinsic and instrumental value. 
However, many parents were ambivalent about receiving SVs 
[secondary variants], conveying a sense of self-imposed obligation 
to take on the ‘weight’ of knowing [this information], however 
unpleasant.29  
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They found themselves in the thralls of duty, undergoing a deep normative pull, to 
take on the weight of this knowledge. Would you take on this weight? 
 
After being told that there is secondary variant information, you, 
after much deliberation, decide to decline the information. Yet, if 
something happens down the road, how will you deal with 
knowing you might have mitigated it? If you accept it, won’t that 
information affect how you treat your child? When and in what 
way will you tell them? How old is old enough to learn you might 
suffer an early death or will soon be living with some kind of 
illness or disease? Fifteen? Twenty-one? Forty? There are no easy 
answers and no way out of this dilemma once you’re in it.30  
Anderson et al. suggest the term inflicted oughts to refer to the obligation to take 
on the weight of knowing secondary variant information. What does it mean to 
inflict an ought? To inflict a responsibility or duty as one would a wound? What 
is the relationship between control and care, between homo faber and homo 
curare offered here? Most imagine the knowledge provided by secondary variants 
of GSTs to be a good—a good even if the specific information they proffer 
portend something bad—a good we seek and simultaneously hate to find. Is it, 
though? Even if research concerning the psychosocial impacts of genomic testing 
found it to not cause empirically demonstrable harm, would that mean this 
information thereby contributes to individual or familial wellbeing or—just as, if 
not far more importantly—contributes to a more just and equitable society?31 
What reveries are at play here? 
Justice and the Realization of Care 
If, for homo faber, care is conducted as control over fate, conducted as a 
desire for existential homeostasis, then the scenes of care and the use of GSTs 
discussed above turn on the conversion of the fear of death as linked to 
abnormality into a knowledge that allows one to regulate or control that fear, the 
course of one’s life, and the eventualities of one’s ability transitions and ultimate 
death—and/or, by extension, that of one’s loved ones. As Attic tragedy works to 
make clear, such knowledge always comes with a cost. And, as contemporary 
scholarship in critical theory, feminist theory, critical philosophy of race, 
disability studies, and queer theory, among multiple other fields, makes clear, 
such knowledge is also always a product of power—of one’s place, historical 
context, social position, etc. Knowledge such as this is haunted by epistemologies 
of ignorance.32 
 For example, there are harrowing racial dimensions embedded in the value 
and interpretation of genomic knowledge. That a middle-class white couple—
demographically those most likely to have access to and use such genetic 
screening technologies—would be aghast at the thought that their child might die 
at age thirty-five of, say, Huntington’s disease, is in part an existential effect of 
white privilege.33 It evidences an ignorance that too many Black or Latinx 
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parents, for example, must face this prospect as an everyday social-political 
reality rather than as a rare genetic circumstance. It must be faced as such due to 
factors ranging from police violence, to hate crimes, to inequalities of health, 
housing, employment, and other systemic problems perpetuated at state and 
federal levels across the United States—as well as many other parts of the globe, 
to invoke the global colonial and imperial conditions supporting such practices.34  
 With respect to the experience, interpretation, and ensuing psychosocial 
and existential impacts of receiving results from pediatric genome sequencing, 
what is ultimately at stake here for homo faber is the desire to establish that the 
meaning of one’s child’s life will stay the same. This involves a core, operative 
assumption that this meaning will include a long, able-bodied life indexed to 
white, settler colonial privilege—or, on the contrary, the desire to situate the 
future of one’s child amongst that of all the others and other cares in one’s life—
friends, family, neighbors, the environment, etc. Within these cases, at least, 
homo faber figures concern over controlling the fate and facts of one’s child’s life 
and death as a question of the meaning of one’s child’s life as a particular, 
hegemonic figure of the normal. And normality is always already shot through 
with problematic frameworks based upon race, gender, sexuality, nationality, 
ethnicity, class, et al.  
 In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes, “I can only 
encompass a certain duration of my life by once again unfolding it according to its 
own tempo…the ‘synthesis’ of time is a ‘transition synthesis’ and the movement 
of a life that unfolds, and the only way to actualize this life is to live it [et il n'y a 
pas d'autre manière de l'effectuer que de vivre cette vie]; time has no place, rather 
time carries itself along and launches itself forward.”35 In order to function as a 
reverie, health for homo faber must act in ignorance of the very dimensions of 
living it seeks to uphold. For example, it must ignore aging,36 adaptation, and the 
profound necessity of ability transitions and their many bearings and sendoffs; it 
must focus on the micro at the expense of the macro—taking the macro as having 
meaning only insofar it affords the micro its desires; it must overlook and forget 
all the fluctuations, deprivations, and assaults on health that are not simply 
inevitable, but which condition the possibility of life and any form of “health” 
within and along its course. And, ultimately, it must take on the form of a 
dogmatic idea that suppresses homo curare. Finally, to function as a reverie, 
health for homo faber must occlude the fact that we are beings of flesh. 
In Defense of Reveries of Egalitarian Health 
  The desire to know one’s own or one’s loved one’s future, I have argued, 
is underwritten by two distinct relations to the weight and texture of beings of 
flesh: homo faber and homo curare. I have argued that whereas homo faber leads 
to the desire for existential homeostasis, a feeling of surety that the meaning of 
one’s life will stay the same, homo curare leads to the desire for existential 
support, the provisioning of assistance for the care of those around one. Both 
homo faber and homo curare are integral modalities of the human as a being of 
flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s sense of that term. I have devoted a significant amount 
of the paper to criticizing the dominance of homo faber because it is, regrettably, 
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the default and dominant modality at play in these scenes of care. Insofar as homo 
faber is not balanced with homo curare, it creates a serious problem—especially if 
one keeps larger concerns of social justice and equitable healthcare in mind. On 
the other hand, the modality of homo curare is certainly problematic, morally and 
otherwise, insofar as it alone is dominant. A generalized care for all that fails to 
attend to particular others, including loved ones and close friends, is a failure of 
care and can lead to harms against individuals in all sorts of ways.37 But that is 
not the chief problem genomic medical sciences and what I have discussed in 
terms of the reverie of modern health presents us with; it is instead the dominance 
and hegemony of homo faber. 
 I have further suggested that insofar as modern ideas of health are based 
solely or unevenly on a conception of the human as homo faber, health functions 
not simply as any reverie, but a dangerous reverie that maintains unjust and 
inequitable systems of care. Health is not and never has been individual. It is a 
question of the reach of one’s entire community and society—including the reach 
of oneself into and with all those other beings, human and non-human, that make 
up one’s flesh. 
If we can show that the flesh is an ultimate notion, that it is not the 
union or compound of two substances, but thinkable by itself, if 
there is a relation of the visible with itself that traverses me and 
constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I do not form, which 
forms me, this coiling over of the visible upon the visible, can 
traverse, animate other bodies as well as my own…[then] I can 
understand a fortiori that elsewhere it also closes over upon itself 
and that there are other landscapes besides my own.38 
Just as the most minute change in one’s position can alter not simply the 
“qualities” of any given object in the visual field but the entire tenor of that field 
as flesh, we are caught up, captivated, and yet in cahoots with others and the 
world in profoundly intricate ways. 
 Yet, that is not how most think about or experience health. There is an 
argument to be made that the reverie of health, as sustained by the dominance of 
homo faber, has become a paradigm of the times, metastasizing, as it were, off of 
an individualism at the foundation of the larger neoliberal geopolitical economy 
of the twentieth century.39 Let us not forget that much of biomedicine has 
historically operated with a “research takes all” approach. That is to say, the 
bodies, minds, and well-being of those under the auspices of medical care have 
too often come second or been entirely disregarded for the ends of knowledge-
building. This is especially so with respect to bodies considered socially or 
politically disposable. The Tuskegee and Guatemala Syphilis Experiments.40 
Forced institutionalization and sterilization.41 Henrietta Lacks, the Havasupai 
people, and biological theft.42 Jim Crow medical care.43 On the other side of this 
Mobius strip of the value of health is the pervasive individual desire for health 
and the demands we place—as citizens and consumers, patients and practitioners, 
and workers and employers—to assure and insure it. 
 In order to understand the various ethical, social, political, and 
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philosophical implications of GSTs in general and the problem of secondary 
variants in particular, I have suggested that one must, at minimum, ask (a) the 
phenomenological question of what it is like for parents and children and 
providers in this situation, (b) the evolutionary biological question of what it 
means for an organism to have discovered the genetic basis of its existence, and 
(c) the socio-political and normative question of whether these practices 
contribute to justice given the larger health concerns of everyone and especially 
historically oppressed groups. I have further suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of the flesh and his claims concerning the fundamental tension between 
macro and micro views help us both appreciate the complexity of these questions 
and formulate answers to them. 
 To combat health as a reverie, to combat health as solely figured by homo 
faber, we (and who precisely constitutes this ‘we’ must always be called into 
question) would need to prioritize care and community.44 We would need to 
articulate and realize the values of a future for health fully driven by homo 
curare—a future that is truly egalitarian, truly by and for all. We would need, in 
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